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COME THE REVOLUTION
Transforming the Asia-Pacific’s Militaries
Richard A. Bitzinger

D

efense transformation has preoccupied the U.S. Defense Department for
over a decade. In recent years as well, militaries and governments throughout the Asia-Pacific region have begun to pay attention to the promise and requirements of defense transformation and to the emerging information-based
revolution in military affairs (RMA). Increasingly, their conceptions of defense
transformation, along with their intentions, efforts, and capabilities to transform
their militaries, could have a profound effect upon regional stability and security.
These activities could particularly affect future American security interests and
military operations in the Asia-Pacific—both due to their potential to influence
joint operations and interoperability with U.S. forces and by endowing new capabilities upon potential competitors and adversaries—and therefore could inject
new uncertainties and complications into the regional security calculus.
Defense transformation is much more than the “mere” modernization of
one’s armed forces—that is, being able to fight better the same kinds of wars.
Rather, it is the promise of a paradigm shift in the character and conduct of warfare. At the same time, it is more than simply overlayMr. Bitzinger is an associate professor with the Asiaing new technologies and new hardware on existing
Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii.
He is the author of Towards a Brave New Arms Industry?
force structures; it requires fundamental changes in
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military doctrine, operations, and organization. For
Paper (2003).
these reasons, therefore, transformation is an increasThe analyses and opinions expressed in this paper are
ingly loaded issue, with many implications for defense
strictly those of the author and should not be construed
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and security in the Asia-Pacific. Moreover, for these
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same reasons, transformation in the region is beset
with considerable challenge.
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This article specifically addresses the process, problems, and prospects of and
for defense transformation in the Asia-Pacific region. Basically, it argues that
while several countries there are closely studying and assessing the implications
of the emerging revolution in military affairs, they have, for a variety of reasons,
made little progress so far in actually transforming their armed forces along its
lines. In fact, most countries in the region are unlikely, despite their best efforts,
to move beyond “modernization-plus,” at least not any time soon. Even this process of innovation, however, could still have many repercussions for regional security and stability, and in ways not currently being contemplated.
WHAT DO WE MEAN BY DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION?
“Defense transformation” is an ambiguous but nevertheless bounded term. No
strong consensus exists as to what defense transformation exactly means or entails. Some analysts and proponents of defense transformation view it as simply
1
another name for the revolution in military affairs. Certainly the two terms are
used increasingly interchangeably. But this still leaves unanswered what we
mean by a revolution in military affairs and what the current RMA stands for. To
cloud the issue even further, some students of defense transformation define it
mainly as a process of implementing an RMA, while others see it as an objective
in and of itself.
A revolution in military affairs is generally described as a “discontinuous,” or
2
“disruptive,” change in the concept and mode of warfare. For example, it has
been argued that a revolution in military affairs occurs when “the application of
new technologies into a significant number of military systems combines with
innovative operational concepts and organizational adaptation in a way that
fundamentally alters the character and conduct of a conflict. It does so by producing a dramatic increase . . . in the combat potential and military effectiveness
3
of armed forces.” In a similar vein, the RAND Corporation defines an RMA as
“a paradigm shift in the nature and conduct of military operations which either
renders obsolete or irrelevant one or more core competencies in a dominant
player, or creates one or more core competencies in some dimension of warfare,
4
or both.”
Most analysts and proponents of defense transformation are in general agreement that the current RMA—and therefore the current process of transformation—has been primarily driven and enabled by dramatic advances in information
technology (IT) over the past two or three decades. The information revolution,
supplemented by recent advances in new materials and construction techniques,
has made possible significant innovation and improvement in the fields of sensors,
seekers, computing and communications, automation, range, precision, and
5
stealth. In one sense, therefore, defense transformation is inexorably linked to

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss4/6

2

Bitzinger: Come the Revolution—Transforming the Asia-Pacific’s Militaries
BITZINGER

41

emerging concepts of network-centric warfare (NCW, sometimes referred to as
“network-enabled” warfare)—vastly improved battlefield knowledge and connectivity through IT-based breakthroughs that create more capable command, control,
communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(C4ISR) networks. NCW, according to the Defense Department’s Office of Defense
Transformation, “generates increased combat power by networking sensors,
decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of
command, high tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and
6
a degree of self-synchronization.”
The key characteristics of a transformed force, therefore, include:

• Networked C4ISR, weapons, and platforms
• Shared situational awareness
• More accurate and standoff engagement
• Agility, speed, rapid deployability, and flexibility
• Jointness and interoperability.7
In a larger sense, too, defense transformation is synergistic—it entails the integration and employment of C4ISR systems, platforms, and weapons (particularly smart munitions) in ways that increase their aggregate effectiveness and
capability beyond their individual characteristics. This bundling together is
reminiscent of William A. Owens’s “system of systems” concept, in that it entails
the linking together of several types of discrete and even disparate systems
across a broad geographical, interservice, and electronic spectrum in order to
8
create new core competencies in war fighting.
Obviously, defense transformation entails much more than just force modernization. Hardware and technology are obviously crucial and primary components, fundamental building blocks in the modern, IT-based RMA, centered on
network-centric warfare and reconnaissance-strike complexes. Transformation,
however, is not simply a techno-fix. It entails fundamentally changing the way a
military does its business—doctrinally, organizationally, and institutionally. It
also requires advanced systems integration skills to knit together disparate military systems into complex operational networks. Finally, it demands elemental
changes in the ways militaries procure critical military equipment, and reform
of the national and defense technological and industrial bases that contribute to
development and production of their transformational systems. All this, in turn,
requires vision and leadership at the top in order to develop the basic concepts of
defense transformation, establish the necessary institutional and political momentum for implementing transformation, and allocate the financial resources
9
and human capital required for the task of implementation.
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DEFENSE MODERNIZATION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC
Many militaries in the Asia-Pacific have greatly expanded their war-fighting capacities since the beginning of the 1990s. This modernization effort has gone far
beyond merely replacing older fighter aircraft with more sophisticated versions
or buying new tanks and artillery pieces; rather, they have over the past decade
added capabilities that they did not possess earlier, such as new capacities for
force projection and standoff attack, low observability (stealth), and greatly improved C4ISR. Consequently, several armed forces in the Asia-Pacific now deploy or will soon acquire several new weapons platforms, advanced armaments,
or sophisticated military systems, including aircraft carriers, submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, air-to-air refueling aircraft, longer-range air-to-air missiles,
and modern antiship cruise missiles. For example:

• China, India, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan have either
expanded or else are in the process of expanding their blue-water navies
with modern, foreign-built—or foreign-designed but locally constructed—
destroyers, frigates, missile patrol boats, and diesel-electric submarines.

• Thailand has acquired a small aircraft carrier from Spain; India has recently
concluded an agreement to purchase a used, refurbished, and reequipped
carrier from Russia; and Japan plans to construct two flat-top “helicopter
destroyers.”

• China, India, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore have all received
or will soon acquire tanker aircraft for air-to-air refueling.

• Nearly every Asia-Pacific country currently possesses at least some fourthgeneration fighter aircraft—such as the Russian Su-27, Su-30, or MiG-29;
the American F-16 or F/A-18; and the French Mirage-2000—capable of
firing standoff, active, radar-guided air-to-air missiles like the U.S.
AMRAAM or the Russian AA-12.

• India is developing a supersonic antiship cruise missile in cooperation with
Russia, while China has purchased such missiles from Russia to outfit its
destroyers.

• Australia, India, Japan, and Taiwan have plans to acquire missile defenses,
either in cooperation with other countries or through the purchase of
off-the-shelf systems.
In particular, most Asia-Pacific militaries are greatly expanding and upgrad10
ing their C4ISR capabilities. China, Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan all possess
airborne early warning and command aircraft, while Australia, India, and South
Korea intend to acquire them in the near future. Australia, Japan, and South
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Korea have or will soon have the Aegis naval sensor and combat system deployed
on their largest surface combatants, while Taiwan is buying long-range earlywarning radar. Nearly every major military in the region is acquiring unmanned
aerial vehicles and are increasingly using space for military purposes, including
satellites for surveillance, communications, and navigation/target acquisition.
Several countries in the region—particularly Australia, China, Japan, Singapore,
South Korea, and Taiwan—have also made or are presently making considerable
investments in new types of information processing and data fusion, command
and control, and the digitization of their armed forces. South Korea, for example, is developing a new tactical integrated communications system, while
Taiwan is spending more than two billion dollars on a new military-wide C4ISR
network that will link communications, computers, and sensors.11 China is reportedly working hard to expand and improve its C4ISR
Ultimately, “defense transformation” does not
and information operations/
adequately describe current efforts by Asia-Pacific
information warfare capabilinations to upgrade and reform their militaries—
ties, with particular attention
“modernization-plus” is more apt.
to creating a separate military
communications network,
using fiber-optic cable, satellites, microwave relays, and long-range, highfrequency radio. Much of the hardware and technology bolstering China’s
emerging C4I and information operations capability is basically dual use in nature; the military has benefited indirectly from developments and growth in the
12
country’s commercial information-technology industry. Singapore already
possesses a nationwide secure C4I network, utilizing microwave and fiber-optic
13
channels linked to air and maritime surveillance systems.
The acquisition of these new military capabilities has many implications for
militaries in the Asia-Pacific. At the very least, they promise to upgrade and
modernize war fighting in the region significantly. Certainly, Asia-Pacific militaries are acquiring greater lethality and accuracy at greater ranges, improved
battlefield knowledge and command and control, and increased operational
maneuver and speed. Standoff precision-guided weapons, such as cruise and
ballistic missiles and terminal-homing (such as GPS or electro-optical) guided
munitions, have greatly increased combat firepower and effectiveness. The addition of modern submarines and surface combatants, amphibious assault ships,
air-refueled combat aircraft, and transport aircraft have extended these militaries’ theoretical range of action. Advanced reconnaissance and surveillance platforms have considerably expanded their capacities to look out over the horizon
above, below, and on the sea surface. Additionally, through increased stealth and
active defenses (such as missile defense and longer-range air-to-air missiles),
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local militaries are adding substantially to their survivability and operational effectiveness. Consequently, conflict in the region, should it occur, would likely be
more “high-tech” than in the past—faster, longer in reach, and yet more precise
and perhaps more devastating in its effect.
More important, many Asia-Pacific militaries are acquiring military equipment that, taken together, forms the kernel of what is required to transform their
militaries fundamentally. In particular, those systems related to precision strike,
stealth, and above all C4ISR constitute some of the key hardware ingredients essential to a modern RMA. These emerging capabilities, in turn, have real potential to affect strategy and operations on tomorrow’s battlefield and hence to alter
the determinants of critical capabilities in modern warfare.
DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
If Asia-Pacific militaries have been amassing much of the hardware necessary
for defense transformation, “the acquisition of new technology is only the first
and often the easiest step” in realizing an RMA.14 It is necessary as well, therefore,
to develop the “software”—the doctrine, tactics, and organization—necessary
to take full advantage of these new technologies. Accordingly, many militaries
and governments in the Asia-Pacific region are studying, assessing, and even experimenting with such aspects of transformation.
Much of this speculation and experimentation has been driven by the current
debate over the future transformation of the U.S. armed forces. The United
States is recognized to be at the forefront, in terms of strategy, operations, and
technology, when it comes to conceptualizing and implementing transforma15
tion. Consequently, American models of the information technology–based
RMA and defense transformation have typically been the point of departure for
discussion and evaluation in the Asia-Pacific.
Talking the Talk . . .
Interoperability with U.S. forces has been a key factor, driving much of the current thinking about defense transformation in the Asia-Pacific. U.S. allies and
friendly nations in the region—particularly Australia, Japan, South Korea, and
Taiwan—appear to be particularly keen on studying and possibly implementing
transformations of their respective militaries specifically in order to remain
compatible with U.S. forces, particularly as the likelihood of coalition operations with the United States—such as in Iraq or Afghanistan—is expanding.
This enhanced interoperability is especially crucial for regional allies as the
United States continues to transform its own armed forces, since it would permit
their militaries to tie into and take advantage of American progress in
transformational warfare. The Aegis combat system could enable Japanese and
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South Korean ships to link with U.S. naval forces in cooperative engagements
against opposing forces, or, in the case of Japan, to work with the United States in
developing and deploying ship-based missile defenses. At the same time, defense
transformation on the part of key U.S. allies and other friendly countries in the
Asia-Pacific could greatly benefit the United States, by strengthening bilateral
military alliances and burden sharing.
Australia. In 1999, having looked at the issue of defense transformation since
mid-decade, the Australian Department of Defense established an Office of the
Revolution in Military Affairs to review technological developments and explore strategies for implementing an Australian RMA, particularly in partner16
ship with the United States. According to one report, the four key components
of the Australian RMA are weapons lethality, force projection, information pro17
cessing, and intelligence collection. In terms of practical results, Australia
stresses developing and enhancing the mobility, firepower, and sustainability of
the Australian Defense Forces (ADF) by expanding interservice jointness, increasing logistical support, strengthening amphibious and expeditionary capabilities, and making improvements in precision strike and in intelligence
18
gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
In particular, the ADF places increasing emphasis on network-centric
19
warfare as a way to gain a “knowledge edge” over potential competitors. The
knowledge-edge concept is “the effective exploitation of information technologies to allow us to use our relatively small force to maximum effective20
ness.” NCW is intended not only to provide the ADF a force multiplier that
maintains a technological edge over much larger potential adversaries (such
as Indonesia) but to enhance cooperation and interoperability with U.S.
21
forces. In this regard, Australia especially looks to leverage its limited indigenous high-technology core competencies—such as its Jindalee over-thehorizon radar network—in collaborative weapons programs with the United
States. 22
China. Beijing has also been particularly influenced by the emerging IT-based
RMA. China is currently engaged in a determined effort to modernize its armed
forces, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), in order to be able to fight and win
23
“limited wars under high-tech conditions.” This doctrine revolves around
short-duration, high-intensity conflicts characterized by mobility, speed, and
long-range attack, employing joint operations fought simultaneously throughout the entire air, land, sea, space, and electromagnetic battle space, and relying
heavily upon extremely lethal, high-technology weapons. PLA operational doctrine also emphasizes preemption, surprise, and shock, given that the earliest
stages of conflict may be crucial to the outcome of a war.
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In this regard, many in the PLA see considerable potential for force multiplication in such areas as information warfare, digitization of the battlefield, and
24
networked systems. As already mentioned, China is greatly expanding its
C4ISR capabilities. At the same time, it sees adversaries who are highly dependent upon advanced technology—such as the United States—as susceptible to
low-tech countermeasures or attacks on their own command, control, and communications capabilities. Consequently, the PLA has devoted increasing atten25
tion to asymmetric responses that enable “the inferior to defeat the superior.”
These systems are sometimes lumped together as “assassin’s mace” or “trump
26
card” weapons. Some assassin’s-mace weapons would be used against an enemy’s vulnerabilities, as in computer-network attacks. Information warfare is a
potentially critical new development in the PLA’s war-fighting capabilities. The
PLA is reportedly experimenting with information-warfare operations, and it
has established special units to carry out attacks on enemy computer networks
27
in order to blind and disrupt an adversary’s C4I systems.
Other assassin’s-mace weapons are existing systems, development or deployment of which have been accelerated because they have proved to be among the
most effective weapons in the PLA’s arsenal. This category of weapons particularly
includes tactical ballistic missile systems—such as the six-hundred-kilometerrange CSS-6 and three-hundred-kilometer CSS-7 missiles—which are being fitted with satellite-navigation guidance for improved accuracy and with new
types of warheads (such as cluster submunitions and fuel-air explosives) for
higher lethality. Finally, there are the so-called new-concept arms, such as kineticenergy weapons (such as railguns), lasers, radiofrequency and high-powered
28
microwave weapons, and antisatellite systems.
India. The 1991 Gulf War led India to pay closer attention to the promise and
challenges of the emerging IT-based RMA. Many Indians have become increasingly concerned about growing American technological prowess and the
near-global dominance of the United States as a conventional military power.
Some Indians have called for corresponding, if perhaps asymmetric, capabilities
29
to deal with this new military-technological reality. This response holds that
India must in particular exploit the emerging information revolution in warfare
if it wants to be taken seriously as a regional and global power, to have a “fighting
30
chance in future conflicts.” India’s rapidly growing information-technology
31
sector is seen as potentially critical in this effort.
Japan. Japanese interest in defense transformation is largely rooted in the 1998
North Korean Taepo Dong missile test, which alerted Tokyo to the need to reform and reorient its Self-Defense Forces to new threats, particularly ballistic
32
missiles and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Other concerns
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driving Japan’s interest in transformation include the possibility of cyber attacks
on its national information infrastructure, the likely expansion of involvement
in international military operations (such as in Iraq), and increased military cooperation with the United States in regional security undertakings (such as the
33
Proliferation Security Initiative). At the same time, the Japanese must cope
with severe fiscal constraints and a political need to keep casualties low in the
34
event of conflict.
The Japan Defense Agency (JDA) has designated its transformational concept
the “Info-RMA.” This Info-RMA is based on the premise that future warfare will
be characterized by a huge leap in battlespace awareness, precision-strike engagement, coordinated attack by small, widely dispersed units, the heavy use of
cyberspace and unmanned battlefield systems, expansion of the operational
theater and increased speed, and a move away from attrition to “decisive” (also
called “effects based”) warfare. The Info-RMA, which according to the JDA is
based on “the application of advanced information technologies to the military
sphere,” entails information sharing through the creation of an all-inclusive
C4ISR network, greater jointness and speed (particularly in command and control), increased combat efficiency and effectiveness, greater organizational flexibility, protection of critical information systems (such as command and control
nodes), and expanded interoperability with U.S. forces. The objective of the
35
Info-RMA is “a quantum leap in the efficient achievement of military objectives.”
Many of the principles of the Info-RMA can be found in the Self-Defense
Forces’ future defense capabilities requirements. In particular, the JDA’s 2003 defense posture review calls for a joint information-sharing network for ground,
sea, and air self-defense forces, a “technology oriented,” rather than “scale oriented,” force structure (i.e., using technology as a force multiplier), and
interoperability with the United
States through modernization
New military capabilities of the Asia-Pacific
militaries, at the very least, promise to upgrade and digitization.36 In addition, Japan plans to increase greatly its
and modernize war fighting in the region
missile defense initiatives, in part
significantly.
by upgrading its naval Aegis systems to defend against missile attacks and by expanding cooperation with the
United States on joint missile defense research and development. In fact, missile
defense could become a catalyst for defense transformation in Japan, as it could
effect critical policy changes (such as amendment of Article 9 of the constitution
to permit expanded U.S.-Japan cooperation in collective self-defense), promote
the acquisition of a joint C4ISR network, and help reform Japan’s defense re37
search, development, and industrial infrastructure.
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Singapore. Interest in defense transformation in Singapore stems both from
strategic weaknesses—lack of strategic depth, a small and aging population, and
relatively limited defense resources—and economic and technological advantages, particularly a highly educated workforce and strong information technologies. Singapore’s Ministry of Defense sees information technologies as critical,
perhaps decisive, in future conflict. The IT-based RMA will
change the nature of warfare. Superior numbers in platforms . . . will become less of
an advantage unless all these platforms can be integrated into a unified, flexible, and
effective fighting system using advanced information technologies. At the same time,
the ever-increasing reliance upon information technology means that protecting
one’s own information systems and disrupting the enemy’s will become a major aspect of warfare.38

Accordingly, Singaporean transformational efforts—referred to collectively
as “Integrated Knowledge-Based Command and Control” (IKC2) doctrine—
emphasize the acquisition, development, and integration of technologies for
command and control with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance sys39
tems and with precision-guided weapons. RMA-related areas currently receiving particular focus include advanced electronics and signal processing,
information systems security, advanced guidance systems, communications,
40
electronic warfare, sensors, and unmanned vehicles. Two new agencies—the
Future Systems Directorate and Center for Military Experimentation—have
been established to help implement IKC2 in Singapore.
South Korea and Taiwan. The Republic of Korea (ROK) armed forces are aware
that future warfare will be quite different from today, that “it will be nonlinear,
41
small-scale, nonconcentrative, and far-separated.” Consequently, they acknowledge that future forces will need improved C4ISR, including networked
platforms, unmanned systems, and real-time command and control, as well as
enhanced capacities for precision strike. Additionally, the ROK-U.S. alliance is
undergoing a shift, with South Korea expected to play a larger role in its own defense; Seoul is exploring ways in which it can become more self-reliant (particularly in early warning, intelligence, and surveillance) but remain interoperable
with U.S. forces.42 Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that the Korean RMA is still
43
very much in its early stages.
Taiwan’s revolution in military affairs is largely predicated on Chinese threat
scenarios and accordingly is very much influenced by Chinese thinking about
44
the RMA. Not surprisingly, Taipei is focused on defending against missile
strikes and securing its command and control network from attacks by the PLA,
while engaging in offensive information warfare against China. Elements of
its approach include early warning systems, reconnaissance capabilities, and
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an integrated and secure command and control system, along with antimissile
45
interceptors and possibly retaliatory ballistic missile systems.
In their efforts to implement RMAs, Seoul and Taipei are aided by large and
growing information-technology sectors. South Korea and Taiwan are both extensively “wired” in terms of cable and cellular systems, Internet use, and elec46
tronics industries. In particular, they possess sizable manufacturing bases in
the fields of computers and telecommunications; together they dominate the
global production of dynamic random-access memory semiconductor chips.
. . . But Not Walking the Walk
Notwithstanding all the discussion, debate, and evaluation regarding the value
and effectiveness of the information technology–based revolution, most
Asia-Pacific countries have made little actual progress in transforming their
militaries. In particular, there has been little implementation of the organizational, institutional, and doctrinal change that would be needed. Few militaries
in the region have moved beyond the initial “speculation” phase of defense
transformation, and even fewer are testing new organizations or new methods
of warfare, or specifically developing strategies for transforming their armed
forces, or directing resources toward this end. An observation made about recent European transformational activities is equally apropos to the Asia-Pacific,
that they “have been more about producing PowerPoint slide shows than build47
ing demonstrators or pursuing field experimentation.” Even of those that have
done so, none has yet revised its doctrine or fielded reorganized force structures
48
in line with transformational concepts of the IT-based RMA. In some countries—particularly India, Japan, and South Korea—even the debate is still rather
thin and theoretical; any tangible movement toward transformation would appear to be far off.
Even in the case of China—whose “efforts to exploit the emerging RMA arguably are the most focused” of any country in the Asia-Pacific—there is still considerable disagreement as to the significance and potential military effectiveness
49
of PLA force modernization over the past decade. Certainly, the PLA has made
considerable progress over the past decade in adding new weapons to its arsenal,
and China has noticeably improved its military capabilities in several specific areas,
particularly missile attack, air and naval platforms, and information warfare. In
addition, the PLA is reportedly experimenting with digitization and RMA-type
50
campaign tactics. Nevertheless, the PLA continues to suffer from substantial
deficiencies and weaknesses that limit its ability to constitute a modern, trans51
formed military force, and its pace of reform and change has been slow. “Not all
52
military leaders embrace RMA ideas”; consequently the PLA remains overwhelmingly a ground-based army, composed largely of infantry and oriented
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toward linear, attrition-based “People’s War.” Much of its weaponry is still of
1960s- and 1970s-era vintage. In particular, the PLA still lacks the logistical and
lift capacity—either by sea or by air—for projecting force much beyond its bor53
ders. Finally, China’s capabilities in the area of C4I architectures, information
warfare, and surveillance and reconnaissance are still very much in the early
stages of research, development, and deployment. Consequently, China has a
long way to go in terms of defense transformation and of acquiring and applying
54
the state of the art.
Ultimately, “defense transformation” does not adequately describe current
efforts by Asia-Pacific nations to upgrade and reform their militaries. If defense
transformation entails a fundamental and disruptive change in the concept,
character, and conduct of war fighting, then most Asia-Pacific nations are engaged not so much in transforming as in basically modernizing their armed
forces—that is, adding new capabilities and new capacities for warfare but without necessarily altering their fundamental modes of warfare. “Modernizationplus,” therefore, is perhaps a more apt descriptor of what is currently transpiring
in most Asia-Pacific militaries. Many militaries in the region, by buying new
types of precision-guided munitions, airborne early warning aircraft, submarines, air-to-air refueling aircraft, data links, and improved command and
control systems, are certainly acquiring capabilities that they did not possess
earlier, such as new capacities for force projection and standoff attack, low
observability, and greatly improved C4ISR. Nevertheless, this modernizationplus effort is in general evolutionary, steady state, and incremental, and the in55
novation seen here is less a disruptive than a sustaining process.
IMPEDIMENTS TO DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION IN THE
ASIA-PACIFIC
Several factors currently inhibit defense transformation among the Asia-Pacific
militaries. The first comprises costs and resource constraints: transformation, it
turns out, doesn’t come cheap, despite assertions made early on by some proponents that the exploitation of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies
would greatly reduce costs.56 Rather, even to make a start requires the acquisition
of many new and expensive types of military-unique systems. Even many
dual-use COTS information and communications technologies are not easily
(or cheaply) adapted to military use, as they often require substantial modification, such as ruggedization or additional capabilities.57
At the same time, funding for transformational systems must generally compete with large and expensive “legacy” programs—such as fighter aircraft,
tanks, and large warships, as well as huge manpower costs usually associated
58
with sizable ground forces. In fact, in the case of most Asia-Pacific militaries,
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such legacy spending continues to siphon off money that could pay for
59
transformational systems.
Ironically, defense transformation is lagging in the Asia-Pacific despite the
fact that most countries in the region have actually increased defense spending
over the past decade. Military expenditures in the Asia-Pacific market grew by
nearly 27 percent in real terms over the past decade, and an extra $126 billion
was added to regional defense budgets between 1992 and 2002. India’s defense
budget has doubled since the early 1990s, for example, while Chinese military
expenditures have increased more than threefold in just the past seven years
60
(1997–2004). Even the Asian financial crisis of 1997 appears to have only temporarily dampened regional military expenditures; nearly every major country
in the Asia-Pacific had by 2002 sufficiently recovered to raise their defense budgets above 1992 levels.
Nevertheless, even these rising military expenditures may not be sufficient to
fund both legacy and transformational systems or to acquire new systems in sufficient quantities so as to be transformational in their effects. Many Asia-Pacific
countries—such as India and South Korea—still spend less than twenty billion
dollars on defense, and most—including Australia, Singapore, and Taiwan—
61
spend less than ten billion. In the case of Japan—perhaps the only country in
the region with the indigenous technological and industrial capabilities for exploiting the IT-based RMA for transformation—defense budgets have been
62
stagnant for years. Only China has been able to maintain substantial and sustained increases in military spending over the past decade.
In some cases, military expenditures are expected to rise over the next few
years. South Korea, for example, plans to invest more than twenty-eight billion
dollars in modernizing its armed forces over the 2004–2008 time frame. Taiwan
intends to spend an additional fifteen billion dollars over the next decade on
new military equipment, including eight diesel-electric submarines and an
anti–ballistic missile system. It is probably too soon to tell, however, how much
of this extra money will underwrite transformation.
Second, the organizational and institutional cultures found in most AsiaPacific militaries impede transformation. Militaries in the Asia-Pacific are often
extremely conservative, risk-averse, and highly bureaucratic organizations. Of
course, large organizations anywhere, certainly militaries and defense ministries, are typically resistant to change—especially disruptive change, since it can
threaten the stability of normal day-to-day operations, standard operating procedures, war plans, and even career paths. Armed forces are especially hierarchi63
cal, with heavily top-down command-and-control structures. In the
Asia-Pacific, however, the conservative and hierarchical nature of military organizations is often compounded by Confucian principles of harmony, seniority
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over merit, respect for elders (age is often synonymous with rank or leadership),
and concern with face. Consequently, local militaries may be resistant or even
hostile to the disruptive, leveling, and decentralizing nature of transformation
64
and the information technology–based revolution in military affairs.
Another implication of the decidedly conservative nature of regional defense
establishments is a characteristic preference for traditional systems. Local militaries often prize large and conspicuous weapons platforms—such as main battle tanks, modern fighter aircraft, and aircraft carriers—more than less visually
striking but transformational systems, such as UAVs, C4I networks, and precisionguided munitions. In addition, high-ranking military officials seeking to
advance their careers have tended to prefer immediate, high-profile hardware
65
acquisitions over longer-term software fixes. Finally, ground forces predominate many Asia-Pacific militaries (this is particularly evident in China, India,
South Korea, and Taiwan), marking their entire defense establishments with
their penchants for mechanized armor, large ground forces, and force-on-force
66
warfare.
In many cases too this conservative and risk-averse behavior is exacerbated by
“old boy” networks in defense decision making. Throughout the Asia-Pacific,
critical decisions and policies pertaining to national security—particularly
arms procurement, doctrine, and force structure—are commonly made by
small, insular groups of military officers, career civilian defense officials, defense
industry representatives, and private advisers (many of whom are ex-military
men or former bureaucrats, a pattern known in Japan as amakudari, or literally
67
“descent from heaven”). This insularity—often coupled with corruption and
bribery—reinforces a “business as usual” approach, limits linkages to centers of
innovation in the commercial and business worlds, and thereby makes it harder
68
to implement transformation.
Many militaries in the region also lack any tradition of joint operations and
instead possess strong single-service cultures and severe interservice rivalries. In
such a state of affairs it is doubly difficult to introduce ideas of jointness,
interoperability, and combined-arms operations as basic war-fighting concepts,
69
or to create common C4ISR and logistical support systems.
Third, most defense technology and industrial bases in the Asia-Pacific are ill
equipped to contribute much to defense transformation. Most regional defense
research, development, and industrial bases—even in Japan—lack the design
skills, technological expertise, or links to advanced commercial technology sectors (particularly local IT industries) needed to develop and manufacture trans70
formational systems. In particular, these countries’ defense industries do not
possess sufficiently advanced systems-integration capabilities to link together
highly complex systems of systems, such as C4ISR networks. Most of these firms
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are simply not set up to function as “lead systems integrators”—such as a
Lockheed Martin or a BAE Systems—building and leading large teams of disparate subcontractors in a systematic program to design, develop, and manufac71
ture a system to customer specifications. Defense industries in the region tend
to be primarily “metal bashers” as opposed to innovators; local arms manufacturing typically involves production either under license or of relatively simple
indigenous systems, such as artillery pieces or small arms. In addition, heavy
emphasis in most of these countries on self-reliance in arms production means
that resources are often wasted on duplicating the development and manufacture of weapons systems already widely available on the global arms market.72
Local arms manufacturers push their governments to buy systems they are already capable of producing or that offer prestige and global presence—again,
mostly legacy systems, such as fighter aircraft or large surface combatants—
rather than potentially transformational ones, such as advanced precisionguided weapons and joint, networked C4ISR infrastructures.
Should a country choose to acquire transformational systems, it will likely
have to buy them off the shelf from foreign suppliers (particularly the United
States) or develop them collaboratively with foreign partners (again, the United
States). Such programs will have to compete with locally built systems, around
which strong political lobbies often cluster, both for the sake of jobs and in order
to preserve so-called strategic industries.
Fourth, militaries and defense industries in the Asia-Pacific region have few
strong linkages to innovative local industries, such as the information technology sector, limiting the potential for “spin-on”—that is, from commercial to
military. Most regional arms industries are state owned and insulated from both
market forces and the private sector. This demarcation, however, makes it more
difficult for the defense sector to benefit from cross-fertilization with commercial technologies, as well as making it harder and less attractive for civilian in73
dustries to participate in military research, development, and manufacturing.
At the same time, local militaries in general remain distrustful of commercial
74
off-the-shelf technologies and prefer “mil-spec’ed” equipment.
Fifth, the capabilities of local commercial high-technology industries—particularly local IT firms—may be overrated and actually of little use to defense
transformation. While many Asia-Pacific countries boast sizable information-technology sectors, the emphasis has largely been on production engineering, not innovative research and development. The science and technology bases
of most countries in the region are still weak; like local arms manufacturers, they
particularly lack the necessary systems-integration skills to adapt and incorporate commercial technologies in military systems. Hence, with the exception of
Japan, most regional IT production has been at the decidedly low end of the
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75

technology spectrum. Most of Taiwan’s and China’s IT industries are still oriented toward production and assembly according to original-equipmentmanufacturer specifications, for example, rather than indigenous design and
76
manufacturing. Huawei and ZTE, two of China’s much-vaunted telecommunications vendors (the former has indirect ties to the PLA), have prospered by
occupying generally the low end of the telecoms sector—producing basic cable
and wireless systems—keeping prices and production costs low, and selling to
77
the developing world. Even India’s software industry is still largely geared toward delivering highly specialized programs according to strict customer specifications or toward the “grunt work” of the global IT industry (such as
debugging Y2K software or handling technical-support calls).78
As previously noted, South Korea and Taiwan are the world’s leaders in the
design and manufacture of memory chips, but this is in effect the exception that
proves the rule. Dynamic random-access memory chips have practically become
a commodity product, and their
Defense transformation is much more than the manufacture is increasingly being
sent offshore to countries where
“mere” modernization of one’s armed forces.
production costs can be kept low
(such as China, which is becoming an important producer—again, to original-manufacturer specifications—
of semiconductors). At the same time, much of the technology found in South
Korea’s and Taiwan’s semiconductor industry does not seem to be making its
way into military systems; even locally produced defense electronic systems rely
79
heavily on imported designs and components.
Consequently, exploitation of dual-use technologies for defense transformation is unlikely to occur to any large degree in the Asia-Pacific. While nearly all
countries in the region see the great promise of advanced commercial technologies for military uses—particularly information technologies or space—few
have made actual, deliberate, and concerted efforts to engage in such spin-on.
Most exploitation of dual-use technologies in the region has so far been serendipitous and modular—that is, simply “piggybacking” on existing or emerging
commercial systems (such as nationwide fiber-optic telecommunications net80
works) rather than adapting commercial technologies to military purposes.
Even then, dual-use efforts have not always found success, as witnessed by Ja81
pan’s recent setbacks in its space program.
Finally, certain Asia-Pacific militaries face country-specific impediments to
defense transformation. Japan, for example, is still greatly constrained by its
constitution, which bars the country from possessing an offensive armed force;
82
this restriction could be interpreted as applying to transformation. For its part,
India, given the likely threats it perceives from Pakistan and China, appears to be
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more interested in acquiring an effective nuclear strike capability than in engag83
ing in an IT-based RMA.
WHERE IS THE ENDGAME?
It may be premature or even irrelevant to talk about defense transformation in
the context of the Asia-Pacific militaries. Most countries in the region—despite
their best efforts—are unlikely to transform their militaries to the extent made
possible by the information revolution and the emerging revolution in military
affairs, at least not any time soon. There are simply too many factors hindering
or impeding the ability of even the most technologically advanced or motivated
militaries in the Asia-Pacific—including Australia, China, India, Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore—to move beyond modernization-plus. These
factors particularly include budgetary constraints; cultural, organizational, and
bureaucratic resistance; the effect of legacy systems and preexisting procurement commitments; weaknesses in national defense technology and industrial
bases; and underappreciation of the complexity of adapting commercial
dual-use technologies to military purposes. Overall, defense transformation
may simply be too disruptive and too threatening to military and civilian elites,
too expensive, and technologically too demanding.
Of course, it is easy to criticize. Change—especially radical change inherent
in the RMA—is always hard, and it is human nature to be suspicious of and hostile toward the unknown. It should not be surprising to see so much organizational, institutional, and cultural resistance to the idea of transformation. Even
in the United States and Europe there still exist considerable skepticism and
84
foot-dragging with regard to defense transformation. Moreover, transformation as a concept suffers from the fact that it is basically an open-ended, continuous process—since there will always arise new technological innovations that
can affect the character and conduct of warfare, and therefore military doctrine
and organization, where is the endgame? When does a military decide that it has
finally and successfully transformed itself? In point of fact it never can, and so to
fault a country for being at “only” a certain level of transformational capability
or for making “only” a certain degree of progress toward implementing a revolution in military affairs is perhaps unfair.
As a leading scholar has succinctly noted, “hardware may be easily acquired
but the accompanying software (e.g., doctrine, tactics, organizational form, and
macrosocial change) [of defense transformation] is far more difficult to develop
85
and implement.” At the same time, however, transformation along the lines of
the U.S. model may not be necessary to “get the job done.” A modernizationplus strategy—that is, evolutionary and sustaining innovation—alone may be
sufficient to meet most of these countries’ defense requirements, particularly

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005

17

Naval War College Review, Vol. 58 [2005], No. 4, Art. 6
56

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

with respect to their strategic context (that is, their immediate threat perceptions and defense requirements) and their available resources. These countries
do not need to emulate the American transformation paradigm in order to derive valuable new capabilities and other benefits from their current modernization efforts—a partial solution could be, if not revolutionary, more than
adequate. In particular, even overlaying a more capable C4ISR infrastructure on
existing forces could greatly improve these militaries’ fighting effectiveness.
In addition, it may be enough for friends and allies of the United States in the
region to modernize sufficiently for greater interoperability with U.S. forces—
especially with respect to network-centric warfare—rather than attempt to acquire a complete set of transformational systems, in order to fill important
niches in coalition operations. For example, it would be mutually beneficial
were these countries able to cooperate with the United States on missile defenses, such as establishing joint capabilities for early warning and cooperative
engagement in order to bring both U.S. forces and friendly nations under a single defensive shield. In addition, missile defenses, particularly if implemented
collaboratively, could catalyze the development and deployment of advanced
(and shared) C4ISR infrastructures.
On the other hand, simply settling for modernization-plus could mean that
Asia-Pacific militaries—especially those friends and allies of the United States—
will be unable to take full advantage of the potential and synergy of the advanced
systems they are currently acquiring. A particularly pertinent criticism made of
American efforts in 2003 to fight a network-enabled war in Iraq was that it “fatally grafted” advanced sensors and communications onto “old-fashioned command and control systems.” Intelligence had to go up and then down the chain
of command, resulting in delays and “magnification of individual communica86
tions failures.” Such glitches could only be worse for countries that are even less
prepared than the United States to exploit NCW.
In addition, should a country not transform its forces, what recourse might it
have against adversaries who do? In such a case, a country might pursue offsetting asymmetric responses, such as WMD capabilities (along with their delivery
systems, such as ballistic missiles) or low-intensity insurgency and guerrilla tactics; either could result in new threats undermining regional stability. Finally,
the ability of nontransformed countries to participate in joint campaigns with
the United States or operate with American military forces could be greatly limited. Many of these countries (along with America’s allies in Europe and North
America, by the way) are already worried about a growing capabilities gap with
respect to U.S. forces and how it might affect future joint operations and, in
turn, their national security.87 Failure to keep pace with U.S. transformation
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could only widen this gap and reduce these countries to “tool box” status, playing only minor roles in coalition operations.
At the same time, the prophets and advocates of defense transformation need
to do a better job of translating their broad, abstract visions into tangible and
practical realities. What, for example, does network-centric warfare demand in
terms of both hardware and software? What do we mean, operationally speaking, by jointness, interoperability, and networking? For that matter, what do we
mean by “disruptive” innovation, and how do we know when we have truly arrived at a “paradigm shift” that “fundamentally alters” the character and conduct of warfare? If these questions cannot be answered in ways that are
meaningful to war planners, defense transformation will remain an empty
concept.
The issue of defense transformation in the Asia-Pacific region will likely remain a legitimate subject for discussion and debate for some time to come. In
particular, transformation will continue to be a contentious issue, as it is increasingly linked to a number of already critical regional security concerns, including alliance relationships and interoperability, regional competition and
cooperation, arms sales and arms procurement, civil-military relations, internal
security and stability, and the impact of technology and economic development
on comparative advantage. Despite the many challenges of implementation,
therefore, the enormous potential and promise of transformation will continue
to drive regional militaries to explore and experiment with concepts of the
emerging revolution in military affairs.
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